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Homeland Defense and Homeland Security: Creating Unity of Effort

by

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Biography

Robert Gilloon is an Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (AC) in the United States Border Patrol and is currently attending the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL. AC Gilloon earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Florida in 1993. He graduated from the U.S. Border Patrol Academy (located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA) in 1996.

AC Gilloon's most recent assignment was at Border Patrol Headquarters, Special Operations Division, in Washington, D.C. where he served as the Border Patrol Air and Marine Liaison Officer, coordinating air and marine support for the U.S. Border Patrol; and as an Operations Officer in the Southern Border Division. From 2005 – 2006 he served as a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (Course Development Instructor) at the U.S. Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, NM. AC Gilloon was a Lead (Senior) Intelligence Agent in the Havre, MT Sector Headquarters from 2002 – 2005. He started his career as a Border Patrol Agent in San Diego, CA in 1996 at the Brown Field Station and was promoted to Senior Patrol Agent in 1999 at the Imperial Beach Station.

Prologue

Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 1 (HSPD-1) created the Homeland Security Council and states that “Securing Americans from terrorist threats or attacks is a critical national security function. It requires extensive coordination across a broad spectrum of Federal, State, and local agencies to reduce the potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage should such an attack occur. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) shall ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies”.¹ The Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state and local homeland security officials, are working to reduce the threat of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons to the United States. To emphasize, this is a herculean effort that requires unity of effort at all levels - strategic, operational, and tactical; Federal, State, and local-between all responsible entities.

DHS alone cannot secure Americans from terrorists, drug trafficking organizations, proliferation of CBRN weapons and the destructive and disruptive threats they pose. In this light, the most critical threat to the integrity of our Nation’s border(s) and security in general is the possibility of a failure to sufficiently communicate, plan, coordinate, and cooperate across the “broad spectrum of Federal, State, and local agencies” responsible for countering these threats.² We must create a unity of effort amongst all the National Powers so that the ways in which the means are utilized are focused on common ends regardless of whether or not the efforts are taking place inside or outside the United States, or at the national, state, or local level. Creating a unity of effort between the national security powers should not include additional changes to the mission, structure, or organization of DHS, but rather through optimized integration.

In a September 2008 Special Report on homeland security published by the Heritage Foundation, David Heyman and James Jay Carafano suggest that the next Congress and Administration should “shift their focus to strengthening the effectiveness of the national homeland security enterprise as a whole”.³ Homeland Security 3.0 is a follow-up report on a 2004 study, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security. DHS 2.0 recommended more than 40 changes across the organization to include a significant re-organization with the goal of improving “effectiveness and efficiency for preventing and responding to terrorist threats”; many of the recommendations were adopted by Congress and the Secretary of DHS.⁴ The purpose then of DHS 3.0 is to make the case that instead of more structural and organizational changes, the new administration should concentrate on unifying homeland security efforts.

The fixation of Congress and many others on the department as the only solution to all of the nation’s homeland security challenges is unwarranted. While the DHS budget accounts for about half of all federal domestic security expenditures, the homeland security budgets of the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, Energy, and State are also significant. While these departments account for the lion’s share of federal homeland security spending, virtually every federal agency has some responsibility for homeland security. Coordinating all of these activities is Washington’s most important task.⁵

Introduction

The initial focus of this paper was to identify the five (5) most critical areas with respect to the integrity and security of the Nation's borders. However, as the research progressed it became clear that it is not the threats themselves -- namely terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of CBRN weapons -- that pose the most critical threat to the United States, its interests and citizens. The real threat lies in the potential for a failure to unite the efforts of the entities charged with addressing perceived or identified threats. Intelligence shows that these threats are persistent and can materialize and adversely impact us at any time, anywhere, to threaten our most cherished right - freedom.

The advances of the 20th and 21st centuries that have created a more open and free worldwide environment have also created the need for increased and constant vigilance to keep it that way. In this age of information and increased globalization the geography of the United States no longer presents the formidable barrier to attack that it once did, where peaceful neighbors to the north and south, and large oceans to the east and west, proved insurmountable enough in preventing a conventional invasion of the United States by a state actor. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qa'ida and narcotics trafficking organizations most directly seeking to harm America, are not state actors, not conventional, and their strategies and tactics not constrained by the geography that has isolated the United States from past enemies. Additionally, U.S. border geography made it difficult for interdiction efforts of law enforcement to put a serious dent in the ability of smuggling organizations to enter the U.S. undetected. Exponential advances in communication and associated technologies have leveled the playing field with respect to the tools available to those that enforce the law and those that choose to break it. The federal government must adapt and make institutional changes that integrate and align the efforts across

the spectrum to meet this threat. There will be obstacles, as there were in 1986 when the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to unify the United State's military efforts across the four branches, but they must be overcome. As if the aforementioned challenges were not enough, all responsible entities will be working with fewer resources.

The current economic crisis facing the United States -- and the World -- is a major problem with as of yet unknown consequences for the federal budget. Venerable giants in the financial industry have failed and are no longer viable. The federal government has already dedicated approximately \$700 billion to prop up failing banks and keep capital flowing to borrowers. European and Asian governments have also invested substantial amounts of taxpayer dollars. As each day passes the situation seems only to degrade and it becomes increasingly clear that more government involvement and taxpayer dollars will have to be invested for the financial markets of the world to recover. What does this mean for the budgets of those U.S. federal agencies tasked with the national and border security missions, and the state and local authorities that depend on federal assistance? Budget cuts are coming and a reasonable and prudent person would prepare for the worst and hope for the best. While preparing for the worst it would be wise to consider the effects outside the nation's borders that will inevitably affect and influence U.S. national security.

In a Wall Street Journal article titled *The Dangers of a Diminished America* the authors pose the question, "With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish?"⁶ They argue that there will be calls for domestic aid programs to ease the financial burden on families and businesses and that the money is likely to come from cuts in foreign aid. The authors suggest that the ramifications of reducing American influence abroad would create a "power vacuum," which would result in instability for foreign countries

that rely on the United States as a stabilizing force. The two takeaways from this article are that instability abroad will create additional threats to United States security -- both abroad and at home -- and that the agencies tasked with addressing these additional threats will likely be doing so with fewer resources. These challenges must be met with sound proposals and initiatives to address not only current threats, but to build a unified, joint national security structure to meet all future threats.

In a Congressional Research Report titled *Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress* (8 July 2008), author Catherine Dale suggests that there is growing interest and consensus for creating an interagency system that is better able to unify the efforts of all federal agencies in the application of all the instruments of national power.⁷ The report states that recent proposals aim to create this cadre of national security professionals through education, training, and worker exchange programs. One such proposal, the National Security Professional Development Program, is an initiative of the Bush Administration that includes a national strategy, organizational structure, and pilot educational program.⁸ The report suggests the importance of legislation to ensure viability of education and training programs, but lacks any proposals for legislation to create accountability for developing a unity of effort between the federal agencies with national security responsibilities, such as the Goldwater – Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The report even points out that “Numerous senior military officers and defense observers, including General Pace [former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], have asserted that the Goldwater – Nichols reforms would not have been possible without legislation.”⁹

The Current Threat

To understand the need for a unity of effort to adequately address the security threats facing the U.S., one must understand the gravity and urgency of the threats themselves. In a sense, the U.S. continues to respond to new threats in a fashion that may have been appropriate for the Cold War, but not today. New threats are non-traditional in that they are not state actors, are not restricted by the geographical barriers of the U.S., and have at their disposal many of the same tools that were traditionally available only to powerful states. This situation calls for innovative approaches to overcome the advantages that adversaries have gained.

Terrorism

In 2006, the Homeland Security Advisory Council, Future of Terrorism Task Force, was asked to “assess future threats to the United States over the next five years, strategically fine-tune departmental structures and processes to meet those threats, and recommend how to better engage and prepare the American public for present and future challenges.”¹⁰ On January 25, 2007 the task force released their findings. The following is a synopsis of the most relevant findings as they relate to the future threat of terrorism:

“There is every indication that the number and magnitude of attacks on the United States, its interests and its allies will likely increase; Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed by any adversary. We must be prepared to respond to potential threats from unexpected as well as familiar directions; The future of terrorism will depend, in large part, on the use and accessibility of technology; The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology; The core of Al-Qa’ida is resilient and resurgent, and remains a threat to the United States; Looking to the future, a more pressing threat will be the wider movement spawned by Al-Qa’ida and inspired and motivated by its ideology; While difficult to measure with precision, it is known that Al-Qa’ida’s ideology is spreading; It is important to remember that the threat of state-sponsored terrorism will not disappear; The evolving complexity of our adversaries challenges existing paradigms – walls separating state, local, and federal responders are counterproductive, and the bifurcation of homeland security from national security is no longer relevant; Continuous learning is required – especially from allies abroad – as the threat will continue to

evolve; Just as Al-Qa'ida has demonstrated their flexibility and capability to adapt their tactics and procedures due to new policies and protective measures, we must maintain the same level of flexibility, unpredictability and not etch in stone certain policies and organizational structures of the department.”¹¹

In the National Intelligence Estimate, *The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland* (July 2007), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence describes the threat of terrorism to the United States as follows:

“Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to Al-Qa'ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that Al-Qa'ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.”¹²

The common theme here is that the threat of terrorism against the United States, mainly by Al-Qa'ida, remains seriously dynamic and resilient.

Narcotics Trafficking

The National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2008* (October 2007), reports that although law enforcement activities have contributed to cocaine shortages in drug markets nationwide, the highest-ever recorded levels for coca and domestic marijuana eradication, and a reduction in the domestic production of methamphetamine since 2004, challenges remain.¹³ The challenges described below are similar to the terrorist threat in that, despite our best efforts, drug trafficking organizations have also proved to be dynamic and resilient.

“Notwithstanding these successes, many law enforcement challenges remain, particularly the danger posed by the growing strength and organization of Mexico- and Canada-based Asian Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO). Mexican DTOs--the principal smugglers and distributors of illicit drugs in the United States--are exerting more control over illicit drug trafficking throughout the nation. Moreover, Colombian DTOs are increasingly relying on Mexican DTOs to smuggle South American heroin into the United States on their behalf, enabling Mexican DTOs to control the flow of both Mexican and, increasingly, South American heroin to U.S. drug markets. Since 2005 Mexican DTOs have gained control over a much greater portion of the U.S. methamphetamine market. As domestic methamphetamine production has decreased, Mexican DTOs have increased production in Mexico and expanded their methamphetamine distribution networks, supplanting many independent dealers who previously distributed locally produced methamphetamine. Mexican DTOs also are improving and expanding their cannabis cultivation operations in the United States and are coordinating cultivation operations in multiple states, even in eastern states.”¹⁴

“Canada-based Asian DTOs are a significant and growing concern to law enforcement. Canada-based Asian DTOs are increasingly producing high-potency marijuana in the United States at indoor sites and have relocated some of their growing operations from Canada to states in the Northwest and Northeast. Canada-based Asian DTOs also have largely reconstituted a U.S. MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as ecstasy) market that was greatly diminished after many of the principal organizations that supplied the drug to U.S. distributors were dismantled by law enforcement in 2002. Canada-based Asian DTOs have greatly increased MDMA production in Canada and have established wholesale distribution operations in several U.S. cities. These Asian DTOs are now the principal suppliers of the drug in the United States. In addition, Canada-based Asian DTOs are increasingly producing methamphetamine in very

large clandestine laboratories in Canada for distribution in both Canada and the United States.”¹⁵

Threat of Proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN)

Jane’s *Sentinel Security Assessment for North America* (October 17, 2008) provides the following CBRN assessment:

“The US intelligence agencies are particularly concerned about the potential for terrorists to acquire or gain access to WMD or CBRN weapons and delivery systems. Conventional explosive devices continue to be the most likely tools for attacking US targets, both because they are more easily available and can be adapted to overcome security obstacles with greater ease. However, there is persistent evidence of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups seeking to acquire CBRN materials and weapons, which in crude form are relatively easily available. Active state sponsorship and assistance of non-state groups in the procurement and development of WMD and CBRN capabilities also remains an issue of concern for the US intelligence agencies.”¹⁶

The U.S. has the technology and personnel to defeat the aforementioned threats and it lies in our ability to unite the effort across the spectrum of national security powers. To provide a snapshot of current DoD and DHS capabilities, the potential for unification of effort, and where improvements can be made, we’ll examine homeland defense and homeland security from a border security perspective. Nowhere is there a better example for creating an incredibly formidable national security unity of effort by integrating existing resources than in the realm of border security.

Homeland Defense

Homeland Defense is defined by the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats or aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.”¹⁷

“Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense.”¹⁸

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

USNORTHCOM was created on October 1, 2002 to “provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities” as a regional combatant command.¹⁹ USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.²⁰ The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a subordinate entity under the command of USNORTHCOM.²¹ Additionally, there are several subordinate commands and five (5) subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTF) that fall under USNORTHCOM.²²

The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are assigned to “provide an administrative framework to command service forces” during specified operations.²³ Based out of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Army North (ARNORTH) has Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) assigned to all of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional offices, with additional

personnel assigned during crisis response. NORTHCOM's air component, Air Force North (AFNORTH), is based out of Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Assets consist of U.S. aircraft, mobile ground-based air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and a joint air surveillance system in cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).²⁴ Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH) is a Marine Forces Reserve Command based out of New Orleans, Louisiana. It is charged with force-protection of Marine installations, coordinating Marine forces assigned to NORTHCOM, and assisting NORTHCOM civil support planning through 32 Marine Preparedness Liaison Officers.²⁵

The five JTFs that fall under USNORTHCOM are: JTF North (JTF-N), Standing Joint Forces Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N), JTF Alaska (JTF-AK), JTF Civil Support (JTF-CS), and Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR). JTF-N is based out of Fort Bliss, Texas and is the DoD entity responsible for providing support to federal law enforcement agencies.²⁶ For example, JTF-N brings to bear military capabilities, such as mobile ground based radar, in support of border security operations being conducted by the United States Border Patrol. SJFHQ-N, located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, "maintains situational awareness across NORTHCOM's area of responsibility," and provides command and control.²⁷ JTF-AK is located at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, "to coordinate land defense and DoD support to civil authorities in Alaska."²⁸ JTF-CS is based out of Fort Monroe in Hampton, Virginia. It "assists the lead federal agency managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident in the United States or its territories and possessions."²⁹ JFHQ-NCR is at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. "It coordinates with Coast Guard District 5, the DHS Office of National Capital Region, and other

Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure unity of effort in the event of manmade or natural catastrophes.”³⁰

USNORTHCOM has liaison officers from many different federal and non-federal agencies located at Peterson AFB, CO. “Liaisons provide subject matter expertise and direct lines of communication with their parent organizations,” for example the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.³¹ According to a 2006 interview in Joint Forces Quarterly, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale stated that DoD had 65 people working in DHS, with senior officials meeting daily.³²

Within the homeland defense structure there are significant assets, that if integrated with those of DHS, would provide an incredible boost to the capability of both organizations to meet the security threats of today and beyond. An optimized integration will not occur through liaison officers alone. Liaison officers are useful to increase communication and coordination, convey commanders’ intent, and develop important relationships; and can recommend, suggest, and advise, but are rarely, if ever, empowered to decide -- the result is a lack of accountability. This accountability will only exist if liaison officers are granted authority to make decisions in line with their respective commander’s intent. Granting liaison officers decision-making authority during joint tours of duty will provide accountability for creating a unity of effort between homeland defense and homeland security efforts.

Homeland Security

Homeland Security is defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”³³ Created in March 2003, DHS is comprised of the U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Secret Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, National Cyber Security Center, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.³⁴ For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on those entities most directly responsible for the border security mission on a daily basis.

Border Security

The federal agencies most closely associated with border security are Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).³⁵ The main focus here will be on CBP due to the core competency of border security and proximity to the international border. Under CBP, the United States Border Patrol (USBP), Office of Field Operations (OFO), and Office of Air and Marine (A&M) share responsibility for the border security mission, as delegated by the Secretary of DHS. The USBP is responsible for those areas of the international border that lie between official ports of entry, OFO is responsible for all immigration and trade related activities at each port of entry, and A&M is responsible for providing the aviation and marine support necessary to carry out the border security mission.

The USBP is the uniformed law enforcement arm of DHS charged with enforcing federal laws under the following authorities: Title 8 USC (Immigration), Title 18 USC (Criminal), Title

19 USC (Customs), and Title 21 USC (Narcotics). “Its primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and unauthorized aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals.”³⁶

“At official ports of entry, CBP officers are responsible for conducting immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections on entering aliens.”³⁷ CBP officers inspect immigration documents of people requesting entry into the U.S. and either approve or deny entry. With respect to trade, they enforce import and export rules and regulations. Additionally, CBP officers perform agricultural inspections to ensure that only approved plants and animals, and related products, enter the U.S.

ICE is the “principle investigative arm of DHS.”³⁸ ICE supports border security by targeting the people and money that are behind the criminal organizations attempting to smuggle contraband and people into the U.S. ICE operates not only along the international borders with Canada and Mexico, but also in the interior of the U.S. For example, during routine patrol duties a Border Patrol agent discovers evidence indicating that a large-scale narcotics or human smuggling organization is active in a given area of operations. The Border Patrol agent will initiate a process by which the ICE office with responsibilities for that area of operations receives the information so that an official investigation may begin.

Integration of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Professionals

A good example of DoD support of civil authorities, and the epitome of what can be accomplished by joint DoD and DHS operations, is Operation Jump Start (OJS). On May 15, 2006, President George W. Bush announced OJS, a sustained 2-year initiative to send up to 6,000 National Guard soldiers to California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to assist the USBP in gaining operational control of the southwest border. The soldiers were utilized in the areas of communications, fleet maintenance, tactical infrastructure construction, surveillance support, administrative and information technology support, intelligence analysis, and aviation support. OJS resulted in the return of experienced agents to law enforcement duties from administrative and support assignments, increases in tactical infrastructure (all-weather roads, fencing, and lighting), increases in fleet readiness of Border Patrol vehicles, and contributed to a decrease in the numbers of illegal aliens apprehended along the southwest border from June 2006 through July 2008.

OJS ended in July 2008 despite requests from the governors of CA, AZ, and NM to extend the operation because OJS was designed as an interim measure to allow the Border Patrol to recruit, hire, train, and deploy new agents while increasing the force multipliers of technology and infrastructure. OJS did more than that -- it showed the vast potential for joint operations when federal law enforcement efforts are supported by the resources of DoD. President elect Obama's nomination for the Secretary of DHS -- Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano -- has already indicated that she "still thinks National Guard troops should be sent back to the U.S. -- Mexico border."³⁹ While planning for the possibility of another civil support operation similar to OJS, senior leaders should remember that the success of OJS occurred without optimized integration with USNORTHCOM -- imagine the possibilities that a truly joint effort could offer.

USNORTHCOM did not play an integral role in OJS. There are probably many reasons, but the first to come to mind are that the National Guard soldiers were operating in Title 32 Status, not Title 10, and the fact that USNORTHCOM was a relatively new entity still working on how to assert itself in the homeland defense posture. The important thing to remember is that any future operations on the scale of OJS must include USNORTHCOM to provide the synergy to improve on OJS, and to start the process of creating a unity of effort between homeland defense and homeland security.

Integrating the personnel and efforts of USNORTHCOM, CBP, and ICE would not only increase the resources that could be brought to bear on the security threats that we face, but it would do so in a more effective and efficient manner. We must have DoD and DHS personnel working together on joint staffs to communicate, coordinate, plan, and execute homeland defense and security missions utilizing their respective instruments of national power cohesively. Additionally, we cannot continue past practices of relying on liaison officers that are not authorized to make decisions, but only recommend, suggest, and advise. Creating a unified effort requires professional education and training, joint staffs, and -- most importantly -- legislation similar to Goldwater – Nichols to provide the accountability. There will be institutional barriers and external factors that must be overcome. One of the most pressing external factors with the potential to limit the resources available to homeland defense and homeland security efforts, and make the need for efficiency more important than ever, is the world financial crisis.

Economic Crisis

In *The Nation's Guardians, America's 21st Century Air Force* (December 2007), then Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) General T. Michael Moseley stated:

“In an era of intense competition for resources, all Services must avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap in acquisition, procurement, manning, and operations. To this end, we will continue a series of cross-Service initiatives already underway with the aim of generating new joint synergies across all warfighting domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. We will also work with the rest of DoD to enhance collaboration and interoperability with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, the Intelligence Community, law enforcement agencies, and other interagency partners to facilitate a more effective orchestration of all elements of national power.”⁴⁰

This general sentiment must shape the way we work to defend the United States and its citizens from the persistent threat of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of CBRN weapons in the midst of economic turmoil, from which future budgetary effects will inevitably arise.

Almost one year after General Moseley's statement one needs only to look at the current state of the U.S. economy for a compelling picture of just how much competition for resources and funding there will be for the foreseeable future. On October 2, 2008, Congress passed legislation providing \$700 billion to prevent additional financial institutions from going under and to reassure the rest of the world that the U.S. financial system will recover. The President's Fiscal Year 2009 DoD budget request to Congress is \$515.4 billion, a 7.5% increase over the FY 2008 budget.⁴¹ The FY 2009 budget request for DHS is \$50.5 billion, a 6.8% increase over the FY 2008 budget.⁴² The numbers in and of themselves are not telling, but the funding to cover the “bank bailout” will have to come from somewhere.

Dr. David S. Sorenson, professor at the U.S. Air War College, provides a slightly contrasting point of view. He contends that even though the defense budget is likely to be cut, it is not

necessarily a direct result of the current economic crisis.⁴³ Dr. Sorenson has reviewed economic data and defense budgets since the Great Depression of the 1920's and did not find evidence that economic downturns coincided with cuts to defense spending. He also points out that increases and/or cuts in defense spending do not coincide with which ever political party occupies the Presidency, nor did U.S. defense spending track with Soviet defense spending during the Cold War. In fact, he suggests that the U.S. economy is cyclical and likely to continue to be so, and that the most likely cause for cuts to defense budget increases are "rising social costs."⁴⁴

Dr. Sorenson believes that "politics, more so than economics, drives changes in the defense budget" and he offers the following three points in conclusion of his research: 1) Global financial crisis is likely to be less significant on defense budget than domestic factors, 2) Political system rarely sustains defense budget increases for more than 8 years, 3) Mandated increases in nondiscretionary spending will be more of a limit on growth of defense spending.⁴⁵

It is too early to tell what overall effects the worldwide economic crisis will have on the budgets of DoD and DHS, or for the entire federal government for that matter. Even if the economic crisis is not the main culprit as Dr. Sorenson suggests, there are political factors that he points to that could lead to cuts in discretionary spending. The actions, reactions and initiatives of President Elect Barack Obama and the rest of the world will take time to have an impact. In the midst of all these uncertainties, every federal agency with national security responsibilities should be prepared to make the changes necessary for optimizing utilization of the resources they receive. For context, one can consider the perspectives of two of the decision makers with a direct influence over integral parts of the whole national security effort, which will be discussed in the following section.

Leadership Perspectives

It is helpful to get the perspective of the decision makers to better frame the issue of creating a unity of effort among those agencies charged with the defense and security of the U.S.

Mr. Jim Walker, Director, Alabama Department of Homeland Security

On November 4, 2008, Jim Walker, Director, Alabama Department of Homeland Security provided some insight from his perspective at the state level on homeland security coordination, cooperation, and planning. Mr. Walker said that given the 5 years that DHS has been in existence and sheer size and complexity of its mission, overall there have been exponential improvements in homeland security.⁴⁶ He points to the fact that the U.S. has not suffered a terrorist attack since 2001 as a prime example. But, he also believes that there is plenty of room for improvement.

Mr. Walker is concerned that for whatever the reason, federal officials have been slow to utilize state and local law enforcement officials. He stated that “there does not appear to be unity of effort at the local level – not reflected in funding or policies.”⁴⁷ For example, Mr. Walker believes that the allocation and distribution of federal homeland security funding for the states is mainly to the 50 largest cities that have fiscal advantages over more rural areas. Instead, more funding should go to the rural areas that are fiscally constrained.⁴⁸ Additionally, he says that the main focus should be to “empower the people at the tip of the spear.”⁴⁹ For example, Mr. Walker stated that ICE’s 287(g) program -- where state and local law enforcement officers are authorized to make arrests for immigration violations -- is an extremely effective tool and must be expanded.⁵⁰ He is also aware that the federal government’s ability to fund such initiatives may be reduced as the effects of the worldwide economic crisis are fully realized.

During this time of fiscal uncertainty, Mr. Walker believes that the federal government must decide what the “core homeland security competencies” are and fund them.⁵¹ Then determine the risks of not funding those competencies that, although important, are not at the core of the mission. Finally, we must be mindful of the cascading effects of budget cuts at the state and local level homeland security efforts.⁵²

Lieutenant General (LTG) H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau

LTG Blum, current Chief of the National Guard Bureau and incoming Deputy Commander of USNORTHCOM, believes that at this particular point in time the homeland defense efforts of DoD and the homeland security efforts of DHS are not fully integrated and an optimal unity of effort has yet to be fully realized.⁵³ For example, the fact that there are DoD and DHS liaison officers trying to increase communication, coordination, and joint planning between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions is evidence that a unity of effort does not exist: “When we are fully integrated, there won’t be a need for liaison officers, we won’t need go-betweens.”⁵⁴ LTG Blum also offered a precautionary note with respect to rating our level of unity of effort: “when we are satisfied that the level of planning, cooperation, and coordination between DoD and DHS is adequate, we run the risk of falling into a false sense of security.”⁵⁵ LTG Blum also commented that the economic crisis may not only affect the availability of future resources to accomplish the necessary unity of effort, but also the willingness to achieve it.

The current economic crisis will undoubtedly affect the amount of resources available to all federal government agencies in the near future. LTG Blum stated that during the recovery these agencies will “have some difficult choices to make” and will need to be able to “stretch their dollars.”⁵⁶ “DoD and DHS will have to develop smarter ways to work and reduce redundancy so that we aren’t paying for the same thing twice.”⁵⁷ Concluding his thoughts on the potential

budget impacts and working more closely, LTG Blum said that “often times the need to be creative serves as a catalyst to cooperate in ways that we may not have been able to otherwise.”⁵⁸

Some have suggested that legislation similar to The Goldwater – Nichols Act for the federal government agencies with national security responsibilities would be helpful in creating the necessary unity of effort. LTG Blum was asked if he thought that such a strategy would be helpful and he responded that in his opinion it would be. “Leadership has to have the right mindset;” “we might not have the joint war-fighting team that we have today without Goldwater – Nichols”. 20 years after Goldwater – Nichols, it appears that the joint mindset now exists in DoD and maybe it’s time for the same sort of catalyst to unite the efforts of all the federal government agencies with national security responsibilities.

Conclusion

The threats to the security of the U.S posed by terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and purveyors of CBRN proliferation, are dynamic, resourceful, and resilient. The world in which we now live provides instantaneous access to information, communication from the far corners of the earth, and nearly unlimited transportation and access to all nations. The geographical characteristics that once protected the U.S. from foreign invasion no longer are adequate to protect against the vulnerabilities created by globalization. Not since the Great Depression of the 1920's has the World experienced an economic crisis as dire as the one currently threatening the World's financial system. Whether it directly or indirectly impacts the homeland security and homeland defense budgets, the potential to reduce the available resources is there. This situation calls for innovative solutions and a commitment to forge a unity of effort between all the national security powers.

DHS is responsible for the homeland security mission and for coordinating all of the other federal and state and local government homeland security efforts. DoD is responsible for the homeland defense mission and for providing support to civil authorities in execution of the homeland security mission. DoD and DHS have made great strides, but optimal integration and unity of effort has yet to occur. It goes without saying that this is a massive task that requires a level of cooperation, communication, planning, and execution that one agency alone cannot accomplish. It will take a fully integrated unity of effort to align the ways and means of each entity to work cohesively toward the ends represented by the national interests and objectives of the U.S. as a whole. The failure to fully integrate these efforts is the greatest threat to U.S. border security and national security in general.

Recommendations

It is safe to say that a true unity of effort between the agencies responsible for the defense and security of the homeland does not yet exist, but the capabilities, once united, do exist. The civil support operation OJS -- where 6,000 National Guard soldiers assisted the Border Patrol on the southwest border by filling important support positions while many new agents were trained and deployed -- is a perfect example. To create the necessary synergy and unity of effort we must create a joint culture between homeland defense and homeland security. The first step to creating a joint culture is ensuring accountability for its success. Legislation similar to Goldwater – Nichols could provide that accountability and pave the way for the synergy that will be required to answer one of the biggest threats facing U.S. security, the failure to create a unity of effort between the responsible agencies. Three important first steps that appropriate legislation could provide for are 1) mandated joint assignments, 2) the necessary modifications to personnel systems to allow full integration during joint assignments, and 3) mandates for increased professional education for homeland security professionals to help develop joint mindsets.

The carrot and the stick for creating a joint culture to unify the efforts of the four branches of the military was the Goldwater – Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. “The 1986 Act ushered in fundamental defense reorganization, aimed at reducing inter-Service rivalries and fostering greater “jointness” among the Services.”⁵⁹ The Act and later amendments included a “professional development system for joint specialty officers,” and “requirements for both education and joint duty assignments.”⁶⁰ Ultimately, the Act requires joint service as a requirement for promotion to general or flag officer.⁶¹ Legislation similar to Goldwater – Nichols for the integration of homeland defense and homeland security efforts

could create a mandate for joint assignments between agencies such as CBP and USNORTHCOM, and could also improve intra-agency efforts within DHS. DoD and DHS should have a system in place whereby homeland defense and homeland security professionals serve joint tours at the operational, strategic and tactical levels.

The personnel filling joint positions must be empowered to make decisions based on commander's intent, and not just be relegated to an advisory role. Instead of liaison officers recommending, there should be joint officers/agents/officials making decisions during planning and execution. Personnel systems should be modified so that the performance appraisals for these positions are provided by the gaining commander. This would provide accountability and incentive for making positive contributions to development of a joint culture. Another idea would be to develop similar opportunities for state and local officials to participate in joint assignments at the national homeland defense and homeland security level. Additionally, joint assignments should be promoted and encouraged through promotion opportunities. For example, DHS should give added weight to joint assignments -- as a preferred qualification -- during the selection process for senior executive service positions to encourage participation. Similar programs already exist, such as the DHS fellows program, but they should be expanded to include DoD. Integration can also occur through professional development and DHS can accomplish this by dramatically increasing participation in DoD senior service schools.

In the absence of a non-DoD equivalent, the DoD senior service schools provide the necessary professional development opportunities to develop homeland security professionals with a joint mindset. DHS should increase opportunities for senior leaders to attend the schools, but should also develop opportunities for attendance by less senior personnel. This

would allow DHS to develop joint minded homeland security professionals early in their career through such schools as the U.S. Air Force's Air Command and Staff College -- and the other service equivalents -- at the intermediate level.

The aforementioned recommendations are but a small part of the process of brining the protection of the homeland full circle, and are not new to debates about creating unity of effort. Much insight concerning the possibilities and challenges related to creating unity between homeland defense and homeland security efforts can be gained from study of the National Security Council (NSC) and its interagency process. Referring to the NSC in chapter 17 of *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, author Gabriel Marcella notes that "The principle problem of interagency decision-making is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge."⁶² The author goes on to say that "what is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations", "there ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for joint duty in the military", and "something akin to the Goldwater – Nichols Act is needed..."⁶³ Marcella admits that "interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel systems and career tracking," but that is a small price to pay to avoid the potential for failure to develop unity of effort.⁶⁴

The current national security environment is extremely dynamic and it appears that it will remain so for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, a unity of homeland defense and security efforts is paramount, and the strategic, operational and tactical levels of homeland defense and homeland security planning and execution must be integrated in such a manner that they are aligned toward common national security objectives. Simply stated, the way forward must create incentives and accountability for the expected results.

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